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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Authority for this appeal is found within the confines of 
Section 77-35-26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah 
State Constitution Article I, Section 77-l-6(g); and Section 
78-2a-3 Utah Code Annotated, and the rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals . 
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Text of Statutes 
Unlted States Cons tltutlon, Amendment Six: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
Impartial jury of the state and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
Informed of the nature of the cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses In his favor, and to have the assistance of 
counsel In his defense. 
Un 1 ted States Cons tltutlon Four th Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure In their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated and no warrant shall Issue that upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 12, Utah State Constltutlon: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
aglanst him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in 
his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district In which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guarnateed. The 
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accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Article It Section 14, Utah State Constitution: 
The right of the people against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath 
or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched and the person or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-3: 
Conditions precedent to Issuance: a. A search warrant 
shall not issue except upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation particularly describing the 
person or place to be searched, and the persons,, 
property, or evidence to be seized. 
Utah Code Anno ted, Sec tlon 77-1-6 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is 
en tltied: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or 
by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed 
agains t him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against 
him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district where the offense is 
alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with 
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 
30 days after arraignment If unable to post ball and 
If the business of the court permits, 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice In jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
(b) No accused person shall, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the 
laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights 
when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband nor a husband against his wife; 
and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by 
verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, In case of an Infraction, 
upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
vii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POINT I 
The Appellant exercised his right not to testify at the 
trial. However, an admission against Interest, given to the 
Investigating officer was allowed, and the appellant was limited 
by the trial court ruling from conducting a full cross 
examination, and thus denied a full and fair trial. 
POINT II 
The court erred in denying appellants Motion to suppress his 
admission against interest, since such admission was not 
voluntarily given, 
POINT III 
The Court erred in denying appellant's Motion to suppress 
evidence seized pursuant to a faulty search warrant. The appellant 
moved to suppress on the basis of an Illegal search and seizure 
conducted at the appellant's residence. Apellant contends that the 
warrant authorizing said search was not sufficiently particular 
violating the rights of the defendant guaranteed under the Utah 
State Constitution and the United States Constitution. 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD ALVIN LIKES, 
Appellant/Defendant. 
Case No. 890544-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for burglary of a 
business, a third degree felony. Proceedings were held in the 
District Court in and for Millard County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The owner of Fillmore Diesel received a tip from an anonymous 
caller telling him his business would be broken into on the evening 
of May 17, 1988. (T 125) He notified the police of this and they 
agreed to watch his business on the night in question. (T 81) 
They checked it periodically throughout the evening. (T 82) On 
one of the checks, they discovered the building had, in fact, been 
burglarized. (T 84) 
The police notified the owner of Fillmore Diesel. After 
consulting with a "Confidential Informant" the police believed 
appellant was the guilty party. The police presented their 
information to the Justice of the Peace, Ronald R. Hare. A search 
warrant was issued authorizing the search of appellant's residence. 
(Suppression Hearing T. 3 L. 17) 
Based on the evidence found at appellant's residence, he was 
arrested. Arrested with appellant was co-defendant Nield. At the 
Trial, the prosecution introduced the evidence (a bolt cutter) 
obtained during the search of the residence. 
The prosecution also introduced the statement against interest 
of the appellant. (Trial T. 221 L. 15 — T. 223 L. 2) Appellant 
present at the Trial and exercised his right not to testify. The 
appellant requested that his" admission against interest be sup-
pressed as it was not a voluntary statement. Hearing was had on 
this question (T. 203-219) at which time the Court denied the 
Motion To Suppress, but also restricted the appellant's right to 
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complete cross-examination of the officer, who obtained the 
admission. (T. 219) 
The appellant also moved the Court to suppress evidence (bolt 
cutters) , seized under a defective search warrant. (R. 26) The 
basis therefore being that the warrant failed to particularize the 
property to be seized. The identification of the property to be 
seized was limited to "shop equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk 
calculator, auto tools stolen from Gerald Freeman." The officer 
picked up the bolt cutters sought to be suppressed, took them to 
the alleged victim Freeman, and then made the determination to 
seize the bolt cutters. (Suppression Hearing T. 14 L. 9-14; also 
T. 17 L. 9-13) This notice to suppress was denied by the Trial 
Court. 
No particular inventory of specific property had been 
completed. (Suppression Hearing T. 4 L. 16 and T. 6 L. 12) No 
specific particular description was given as to "shop equipment" 
nor "air tools". (Suppression Hearing T. 8 L. 2-13) The bolt 
cutter had no distinguishing marks. (T. 10 L. 21-25) The actual 
identification of the bolt cutter by victim Freeman was one to two 
days later. (Suppression T. 36 L. 1-5) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The defendant was tried and convicted by a jury. The jury was 
allowed to hear the appellant's admission against interest. 
Appellant was present but exercised his right not to testify full 
cross-examination of the officer obtaining the admission was 
denied. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the accused 
the right to confront his accusers. Without the opportunity to 
cross-examine, the Supreme Court of the United States, and followed 
by the Utah Supreme Court, have determined a conviction cannot 
stand. 
The admission against interest was coerced from the appellant 
by the manner of his handling of the investigatory officer, and 
misrepresentation of the officer. 
The warrant authorizing the search of the appellant's 
residence failed to particularize the property to be seized. The 
terms "shop tools" or "auto tools" stolen does not sufficiently 
guide the officers in his search and seizure of property. 
The conviction of the appellant must be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
In the process of a Trial, the accused is guaranteed certain 
rights under the Constitutions of both the United States and Utah. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
in relevant part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . 
(emphasis added) United States Const. Amend. 
VI. 
In one of the earliest decisions where the Court went into 
detail on the purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the Court discussed 
the purpose behind its enactment. 
The primary object of the constitutional 
provision in question was to prevent deposi-
tions or ex parte affidavits, such as were 
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used 
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal 
examination of the witness, in which the 
accused has an opportunity, not only of test-
ing the recollection and sifting the con-
science of the witness, but of compelling him 
to stand face to face with the jury in order 
that they may look at him, and Judge by his 
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in 
which he gives his testimony whether he is 
worthy of belief. Mattox v. United States, 
156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339 (189-
5). 
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The right of cross-examination is included in the right of an 
accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him. 
A major reason underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is 
to give a defendant charged with crime an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. Pointer v. State of Texasf 380 
U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065. 
Introducing appellant's admission against interest at Trial 
without the opportunity to fully cross-examine the officer who took 
such admission is precisely what the Sixth Amendment is designed 
to protect. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 1074, 85 S.Ct. 1074. 
In Douglas, the defendants were charged with assault with intent 
to murder. They were tried separately. The defendant, Lloyd was 
tried first and found guilty. At Douglas' Trial, the State called 
Lloyd as a witness against Douglas. Lloyd refused to testify and 
invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. Under the guise of 
refreshing Lloyd's recollection, the prosecution questioned Lloyd, 
asking him to confirm or deny statements read by the prosecutor 
from a document purported to be Lloyd's confession. These 
statements inculpated Douglas in the crime. The Court held that 
Douglas' inability to cross-examine Lloyd denied Douglas the right 
of cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause. 
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In 1959, the Supreme Court ruled a co-defendant's confession 
could be introduced into evidence by the prosecution. This would 
not violate the Sixth Amendment as long as the Judge gave the jury 
an instruction to only use the co-defendant's against the one who 
confessed. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 
294. 
Eventually the Court recognized the fallacy of this reasoning 
and expressly "overrule [d] Delli Paoli and reverse [d]". Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, at 1622. 
The government should not have the windfall of having the jury 
be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter 
of law, they should not consider that which they cannot put out of 
their minds. The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be 
overcome by instructions to the jury all practicing lawyers 
recognize as unmitigated fiction, L^d* (citing cases). 
The Court cited with approval Judge Learned Hand, "The 
limiting instruction is a 'recommendation to the jury of a mental 
gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody 
else's." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2nd Cir. 
1983)". Bruton v. United States, at 138, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1629. 
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To attempt to force the jury into segregating evidence into 
separate intellectual boxes. Determining a confession is true 
insofar as it admits that A has committed criminal acts with B, and 
at the same time effectively ignore the inevitable conclusion that 
B has committed those criminal acts with A an impossible task. 
"Indeed, we have expressly declared that to deprive an accused of 
the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law." 
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 405, 85 S.Ct. at 1068. 1 
The Bruton holding, not allowing the introduction of a co-
defendant's confession without a right to cross-examine, has been 
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discussed in great detail in the cases which followed the decision. 
A co-defendant's confession when used against the defendant 
is analogous to a compelled confession. "[i]t is now axiomatic 
that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of 
law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an 
involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of 
the confession". Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774 
(1964) . Without the opportunity to cross-examine co-defendant 
Nield. Appellant Likes was denied due process of law as well as 
the right to confront his accusers. 
2 
An exception to the rule established in Burton is not-
controlling but should be noted. The Court will allow the 
admission of the co-defendant's testimony at Trial even if the 
person who confessed is not present. Provided the accused was 
given the opportunity to cross-examine the confessor at a Prelimi-
nary Hearing. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930 
(1970) . 
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Clarifying why the right to confront a witness is so impor-
tant , the reasons cited by the Court are: (1) to insure the witness 
will give his statements under oath (2) forces the witness to 
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submit to cross-examination, (3) permits the jury deciding the 
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making 
his statement, aiding the jury in assessing credibility. Califor-
nia v. Green 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1985 (1070). 
The cases following Bruton are collected in the most recent 
case where the Supreme Court has discussed these issues. See 
Richardson v. Marsh U. S. , 107 S.Ct. 1702 
(1987). 4 
In Richardson the Court carved out a narrow exception to the 
Bruton rule. After extensively discussing the reasoning and 
holding of Bruton. The Court found it is not applicable in all 
situations. "We hold that the Confrontation Clause is not violated 
by the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession with 
a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is 
"The greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery 
of truth". 5 Wigmore Section 1367. 
4 
The analysis of the court, in Bruton, for the holding; is 
summed up very forcefully by the dissent at 1709-14. 
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redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any 
reference to her existence." Icl. at 1709 (emphasis added). 
The Court also made it clear that before a statement is to be 
affected by the Bruton requirement that it be subject to cross-
examination, it must be powerfully incriminating and expressly 
implicate the defendant. Id., at 1707. 
Clarifying its position that Bruton is still good law subject 
only to a narrow exception. The Court in the case reported 
immediately after Richardson v. Marsh held, a co-defendant's 
interlocking testimony cannot be admitted against a defendant in 
a joint Trial, unless it is admissible under Bruton. "We hold 
that, where a non-testifying co-defendant's confession incriminat-
ing the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, 
see Lee v. Illinois, 106 S.Ct. 2056 (1986), the Confrontation 
Clause bars its admission at their joint Trials, even if the jury 
is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even 
if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him." See 
Cruz v. New York, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 1714, 1719 
(1987). 
At the appellant's Trial, his admission against interest was 
introduced. The confession was not "redacted" so as to reduce the 
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"express implication" and "powerfully incriminating" force of its 
introduction. Richardson v. Marsh, at 1707. 
STATE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In deciding the extent of the rights guaranteed to an accused 
under the Sixth Amendment, the Utah Courts have followed the United 
States Supreme Court's decision and declined to expressly decide 
the issues presented under Article I Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. 5 State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987) See also 
State v. Kendricks, 538 P.2d 313 (Utah 1975). 
Ellis was not a case which directly implicated a Bruton issue 
because the testimony which implicated the defendant was not a co-
defendant's confession, the testimony was offered by a police 
officer testifying at Trial as to the defendant's statements during 
arrest, and the statements did not directly implicate the defendant 
in the commission of the crime, ^d. at 190. 
The Court discussed the defendant's contentions in light of 
the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings. It is clear the law in Utah 
under the Sixth Amendment is controlled by Bruton* 
5 
See footnote 1, supra. 
For a collection of the cases which following the Bruton 
rational, and the subsequent development of a more precise rule 
see Ellis at 190. 
IT 
The Utah Supreme Court is also willing to allow a co-defen-
dant's testimony in to convict a defendantf provided the co-
defendant is present at Trial and subject to cross- examination. 
State v, Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1988) (and cases cited 
therein). 
In Kendricks , the Supreme Court faced a problem similar to the 
one presented by this case, A defendant's alleged accomplice 
refused to testify at Trial. The State then introduced the alleged 
accomplice's testimony at the accomplice's previous Trial. The 
defendant objected claiming the introduction of said testimony was 
a violation of the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights 
to confront witnesses against him. 
In Kendricks , the Court held that the right of confrontation 
could not be violated. The Court cited the provisions of Section 
12 of Article I of Utah Constitution, the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and also Section 77-1-8 of the Utah Code 
Annotatedf which provided that in criminal prosecutions the 
defendant would be entitled to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him. Said section has been repealed and replaced by the 
provision of Section 77-1-6. 
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The new provision provides that the defendant shall have the 
right to be confronted by witnesses against him. 
The Court in Hendricks found that the right of confrontation 
is a fundamental right and is essential to a fair Trial. The right 
of confrontation is based upon the notion that the accused should 
have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. 
The Court found that the defendant had no opportunity to confront 
the co-defendant, nor did his counsel have the opportunity to 
cross-examine him. 
The case was reversed and remanded for new Trial. It is also 
interesting to note the language of the Court in its holding: 
While it is likely that the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the verdict against the 
defendant, nevertheless we cannot appraise the 
effect upon the jury of the reading of the 
testimony of Travis in these proceedings. We 
are of the opinion that it was prejudicial 
error to permit the testimony of Travis to be 
read into the record in this case as no suffi-
cient foundation had been laid to justify its 
admission. 
While attempting to balance the problems recited above the 
Court allowed the appellant's admission against interest. And 
compounded the error by limiting appellant's right to full cross-
examination of the investigating officer who secured the admission. 
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POINT II 
The appellant contends that the admission against interest 
used against him at the Trial was taken by the investigating 
officer in violation of his rights not to testify against himself, 
as found in Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitutionf and 
Section 77-1-6, Utah Code Annotated. He alleges that the admission 
was coerced and not voluntary. Such a determination requires an 
analysis of the facts pertinent to this case. The transcript of 
the Suppression Hearing is short, pages 203 through 215. And the 
appellate Court is asked to review this testimony. The appellant 
points out these factors which show coercion rather than consent: 
1. Appellant was arrested at 1:30 a.nu 
2. Appellant was held in custody and then 
taken to jail at approximately 2:30 a.m. 
3. After arriving at jail he was entered into 
a booking procedure which may have gone to 
3:30 a.m. 
4. Appellant was not intoxicated, but appel-
lant was placed in the jail drunk tank. 
5. Appellant was not given bedding as a 
blanket or pillow, and could not sleep,, 
6. Interrogation of the appellant began at 
1:00 p.m. without inquiry into appellants 
condition, as rest he had received. 
7. The interrogating officer threatened the 
appellant with the words "had enough material 
to put him away forever if he didn't talk". 
8. The interrogating officer lied to the 
appellant stating he had confidential state-
ments implicating appellant in the subject 
burglary, when in fact no such statements 
existed. 
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9. The interrogation lasted for three and 
one-half hours without a break. 
At the conclusion of this three and one-half hour interroga-
tion appellant gave an admission against interest. However, this 
admission was soon retracted, and appellant has continued to deny 
his implication in this crime. 
POINT III 
A search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform 
to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is 
unconstitutional. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468, U.S. 981, 104 
S.Ct. 3424. A warrant must particularly describe the things to be 
seized, as well as the place to be searched. Dalia v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 258, 99 S.Ct. 1682 (1969). 
In State v. Gallegos 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985), the Supreme 
Court reviewed a search warrant for the seizure of "all controlled 
substances and stolen property." While searching the home, the 
officers noticed a Magnavox VCR attached to a television set and 
two video tapes close by. The officer asked the defendant Gallegos 
about them and Gallegos remarked that he had rented them from 
Norton's supermarket. The officer then called the police dis-
patcher and asked her to verify this information with Norton's. 
An assistant manager at Norton's advised the dispatcher that 
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Norton's had not rented the VCR to Gal legos based on the fact that 
there was no rental agreement on file with the name of Gallegos. 
This inquiry took ten to fifteen minutes. After receiving the 
information, the officer examined the VCR and discovered that the 
serial number was missing. The defendant and his girlfriend were 
unable to produce a rental receipt for the VCR and the officer 
seized the VCR and the tapes. 
(The officer in Gallegos did as the officer in the instant 
case did. He seized the evidence to see if he could connect it 
with a crime. Such conduct is the exact act which the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to deter and prohibit.) 
The following dayf the officer called several stores in the 
Provo area trying to determine if the VCR was, in fact, stolen. 
Eventually the ownership of the VCR and the tapes were traced to 
another store, Sounds Easy. (This fact is similar to Officer 
Cory's seizure of the property and then checking later with Mr. 
Freeman to see if it was stolen property.) 
The Court found that the particularity of description 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is essentially a proscription 
against general warrants whereby administrative officers determine 
what is and what is not to be seized. The decision to seize must 
1G 
be judicialf as opposed to administrative/ and a warrant must be 
sufficiently particular to guide the officer to the property 
intended to be seized, thereby minimizing the danger of. an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy. 
Defendant suggests that the property to be seized must be set 
out in the warrant previous to its issuance and not decided on an 
"after the fact" basis by the officer and the alleged victim as was 
done in the Gallegos and the instant case. 
Regarding the use of generic terms in the search warrant, the 
Utah Court, citing State v. Namen, Alaska App.f 665 P.2d 557 
(1983), held: 
Without substantial justification, warrants 
describing property only in generic terms 
(terms applicable to an entire class of prope-
rty) are not favored by law. However, use of 
such descriptions have been allowed when a 
more specific description of the thing to be 
seized is unavailable. Thus, general descrip-
tions have been held sufficient in cases 
involving contraband such as drugs . . . in 
cases where the inherent nature of the proper-
ty south by a warrant precludes specific 
description . . . in cases where attendant 
circumstances prevented a detailed description 
from being given . . . and in cases where 
detailed description has been difficult and 
the evidence established that the stolen good 
sought are likely to be part of a larger 
collection of a similar contraband located at 
the premises to be searched. (Emphasis adde-
d). 
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The Utah Court found that the description '"stolen property" 
was unconstitutionally deficient. The Court found that it was 
"obvious" that the Fourth Amendment's requirement for "pa-
rticularity" was abridged in that case. 
An officer does not have unbridled discretion when conducting-
a search of a residence to determine what property is to be seized; 
such a decision is for the judiciary. The officer is limited by 
the warrant and he has no authority except by its terms. Thus, 
generic descriptions allowing the officer to decide what should be 
searched, and then seized, are not favored. Here, the officer had 
to seek out the owner to decide whether the property had been 
stolen and then decide what should be seized. The decision to 
seize was not determined byu the warrant but by the officer. 
General warrants to investigate and rummage are unconstitutional. 
Clearly, the property to be seized as "stolen property" is 
unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently describe the 
property and allows an officer unbridled discretion. State v. 
Gallegos. 
The next issue is whether the application of a generic 
description (air tools, shop tools, or auto tools) is sufficient 
to save the warrant meeting the particularity requirement. The 
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general premise of the law is that generic descriptions do not 
suffice and are not favored. State v. Gallegos, State v. Namen. 
The search warrant herein identifies the property in only 
generic terms, i.e. "shop equipment, air tools, . . . and auto 
tools stolen from Gerald D. Freeman, Fillmore Diesel, Fillmore, 
Utah, on 5/17/88, during a burglary, and any illegal controlled 
substances". An inventory was being or had been completed of the 
items stolen from the Fillmore Diesel by Mr. Freeman (Mr. Freeman 
was unclear as to when he had completed the inventory) . Said 
inventory itemized the property stolen as to the particular tool 
or instrument with specificity. 
Officer Scott Corey testified that he went to the residence, 
picked up all shop equipment, air tools, and auto tools, and then 
took them to Mr. Freeman for his identification as to which would 
be stolen property, similar to what was done in Gallegos, wherein 
the officer sought out stores to see if the VCR was stolen. After 
Officer Corey picked up all items that fit within the generic term 
"shop equipment, air tools, and auto tools", Mr. Freeman reported 
that none of the property had been stolen excepting possibly the 
bolt cutters. The bolt cutter is not particularly identified by 
Mr. Freeman since it is not distinguishable from any other bolt 
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cutter by mark or identifiable sign. There exists the question of 
whether "bolt cutters" fall within the definition of "shop 
equipment". 
Appellant submits that the exceptions noted in Gallegos do not 
apply here: (1) The items to be seized are not contraband such as 
drugs; (2) The inherent nature of the property is not such that it 
precludes a more specific description. In factf an inventory was 
being preparedf itemizing the particular tool or instrument? (3) 
%The attendant circumstances did not prevent a more detailed 
description. The inventory was being completed; (4) A detailed 
description would not have been difficult nor was it stolen goods 
likely to be part of a larger collection of a similar contraband 
located at the residence. Consequently, defendant submits that the 
general proposition that generic descriptions are not favored 
should be followed and that the Court should find that no exception 
as defined by the Utah Court has been met. 
The Court in Gallegos cited United State v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 
(5th Cir. 1981) in support of the proposition that generic terms 
in warrants are generally prohibited by law. In Cook the items to 
be seized were VCR cassette tapes. The description in the warrant 
allowed seizure of illegally obtained VCR tapes (the actual 
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description is not included due to its length and it being of 
little value to this determination). 
The Federal Court in Cook propounds again the premise that the 
use of generic terms is acceptable only when a more specific 
description of the things to be seized is unavailable. In Cook the 
Court held that the warrant was constitutionally flawed. The Court 
found that the warrant's use of generic terms in providing for the 
seizure of "illegally obtained films . . . not limited to the 
motion pictures described in the affidavit" provided the searching 
agents with little guidance and was unconstitutional. 
The appellant herein suggests that Cook bears relevance to the 
instant case due to the similarity of the description supplied in 
both of these warrants. In Cook the warrant provided for the 
seizure of "stolen VCR tapes" and in this case the warrant provided 
for the seizure of "stolen tools". The Court in Cook held that 
such a description was generic in nature and therefore unconstitu-
tional and the Court should find the warrant in this case to be 
unconstitutional for the same reasons. 
In Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557 (Alaska App. Ct. 1983), the 
Court found that the specificity at which the search warrant is 
directed serves to protect against possibilities of a general 
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exploratory search and assures that articles of property outside 
the legitimate scope of a warrant are not subject to mistaken 
seizure. These exact dangers existed in the present case. 
Search warrants describing property only in the generic terms, 
that is, in terms generally applicable to the entire type or class 
of property rather than specific items, are disfavored in the 
absence of substantial justification. Unlike contraband, such as 
narcotics, there is nothing about the nature or physical charac-
teristics of stolen property that renders it inherently identifi-
able as being stolen; thus characterizations of property in search 
warrants as having been stolen at a given time or from a given 
place will not normally suffice to satisfy the requirements of par-
ticularity, since such characterizations do not enhance the 
officer's ability to distinguish between property unlawfully held 
that is subject to seizure and property of a general class that is 
lawfully held and not subject to seizure. 
In Namen, the Court found that the search warrant for the 
defendant's residence did not satisfy the constitutional require-
ment. The Court found that an inventory could have been made 
available and that a description of the property to be seized as 
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jewelry stolen from a particular residence on a particular date is 
not constitutional. 
The facts of Namen parallel the facts present in Cook and the 
present case. Descriptions of stolen jewelry, stolen VCR tapes, 
or stolen tools or equipment from an alleged victim on a particular 
date are unconstitutional because they do not limit the officer or 
give him any guidance in the limits of his search. 
The Court in People v. Coletti, 39 Misc. 2d 580f 241 NY. S. 
2d 454 (1963) , found that the terms "stolen furniture and household 
goods" are generic terms and deficient. See also State v. Kealoah, 
613 P.2d 645 (Hawaii 1980). 
The State and Federal Constitutions both require that a 
particular description be set out in a search warrant to limit and 
assist the officer executing the warrant. Warrants must specifi-
cally describe the property to be seized or they are unconstitu-
tional. The officer has no authority except through the warrant. 
Therefore, we start with the presumption that generic terms 
are disfavored. Warrants containing generic terms are to be upheld 
only if one of the exceptions as set out above are met. It is the 
defendant's position that the warrant in this case contains generic 
terms and does not fall under any of the exceptions. Pursuant 
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thereto, the defendant asks this Court to declare the warrant 
unconstitutional and to suppress the evidence seized under said 
warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court committed reversible error by admitting the 
appellants coerced admission against interest. Likewise, further 
error was made in admitting the bolt cutters which were seized 
under a faulty search warrant. These errors were then compounded 
when the Court limited the appellants right to cross-examine a 
States witness on materials clearly prejudicial. This was an 
attempt to avoid violations of the co-defendants rights, and the 
result was that error was committed. The conviction should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of January, 1990. 
Attorney For Richard Likes 
Appellant/Defendant 
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